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Vestal: "Wide Open": Nevada's Innovative Market in Partnership Law

"WIDE OPEN": NEVADA'S INNOVATIVE
MARKET IN PARTNERSHIP LAW
Allan W. Vestal*

I.

INTRODUCTION

A decade ago, as the Revised Uniform Partnership Act ("RUPA")
was being drafted, I wrote an article' questioning whether the act should
be retroactive in application.2 As drafted, RUPA applies to pre-existing
partnerships after a certain date, typically bringing to a close a brief
transition period after the initial effective date.3 I proposed that the more
equitable arrangement would be to have pre-existing partnerships
continue to be governed by pre-RUPA partnership law, with partnerships
4
formed after the effective date of RUPA governed by the new statute.
5 and as
I was almost alone in questioning retroactive application,
promulgated by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws ("NCCUSL"), RUPA provided for retroactive application.
The first thirty-six jurisdictions that adopted RUPA almost uniformly
failed to adopt my suggestion, and instead implemented the inequitable
retroactivity regime. 6 And then along came Nevada, and a jurisdiction
finally got it right.
Dean and Professor of Law, University of Kentucky College of Law. I would like to thank
Bill Callison, Biff Campbell, and Tom Rutledge for their comments.
1. Allan W. Vestal, Should the Revised Uniform Partnership Act of 1994 Really Be
Retroactive?,50 Bus. LAW. 267 (1994).
2. See id. at 268-69.
3. See UNIF. P'SHIP ACT § 1206(a)(1), 6 U.L.A. 266 (1997).
4. See Vestal, supra note 1, at 285-88.
5. See Larry E. Ribstein, The Revised Uniform PartnershipAct: Not Ready for Prime Time,
49 BuS. LAW. 45, 77-78 (1993).
*

6.

ROBERT W. HILLMAN, ALLAN W. VESTAL & DONALD J. WEIDNER, THE REVISED

UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT app. B at 507-10 (2005). Two states adopted partial modifications of
the RUPA regime: 1) Arizona, which made RUPA retroactively applicable to LLPs, but not
traditional GPs, and 2) Wyoming, which excluded RUPA retroactivity as to only one section. Two
other states adopted comprehensive modifications of the RUPA regime: New Mexico and Kentucky
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This discussion looks at the retroactivity issue with specific
reference to the fiduciary duties of partners, and suggests that Nevada
provides a useful model. The following section briefly looks at the
RUPA retroactivity regime, the criticisms of that regime, and the state
variations. The third section suggests a better approach to retroactivity.
The fourth section examines, and rejects, interstate competition as a
solution to the retroactivity problem. The fifth section reviews, with
approval, the Nevada model. Finally, in the conclusion, I suggest how
the Nevada model might be profitably incorporated by those states that
have yet to adopt RUPA.

II.

THE RETROACTIVE APPLICATION OF RUPA: RENEGOTIATION

WITH A GUN TO YOUR HEAD
RUPA provides for retroactive application of the new partnership
law regime to pre-existing partnerships. The uniform language provides
for an effective date and for a transition period. Partnerships formed
after the effective date are governed by RUPA. 7 Partnerships formed
prior to the effective date are governed by pre-RUPA partnership law
during the transition period, although they may elect to be governed by
RUPA even during the transition period. 8 At the conclusion of the
transition period, all partnerships---even pre-existing partnerships that do
not elect to come under RUPA during the transition period-are
governed by RUPA. 9
The theory behind the transition period followed by mandatory
application to pre-existing partnerships is that the mechanism "affords
existing partnerships and partners an opportunity to consider the changes
effected by RUPA and to amend their partnership agreements, if
appropriate."'
I have criticized the retroactive application of RUPA on several
grounds. The essential problem is that the retroactive application of
RUPA takes the deal negotiated by the partners and changes it without
their consent, and does so in ways that may advantage some partners
acted in conformity with my suggestion and made the application of RUPA to pre-existing
partnerships fully elective. See infra note 48 and accompanying text.
7. REVISED UNIF. P'SHIP ACT § 1206(a)(1), 6 U.L.A. 266 (2001) ("(a) Before January 1,
199_, this [Act] governs only a partnership formed: (1) after the effective date of this [Act] .... ").
8. REVISED UNIF. P'SHIP ACT § 1206(a)(2), 1206(c), 6 U.L.A. 267 (2001) ("(a) Before
January 1, 199_, this [Act] governs only a partnership formed: . .. (2) before the effective date of
this [Act], that elects, as provided by subsection (c), to be governed by this [Act].").
9. REVISED UNIF. P'SHIP ACT § 1206(b), 6 U.L.A. 267 (2001) ("(b) On and after January 1,
199, this [Act] governs all partnerships.").
10.

REVISED UNIF. P'SHIP ACT § 1206 cmt., 6 U.L.A. 267 (2001).
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over others. The official commentary to RUPA casts this process in
designedly neutral terms-retroactivity "affords existing partnerships
and partners an opportunity to consider the changes effected by RUPA
and to amend their partnership agreements, if appropriate,"'" while in
fact the process is anything but neutral. Retroactivity does not
"afford[] ...an opportunity";" it mandates a change.' 3 The partners do
not "consider the changes effected by RUPA"' 14 in some neutral manner;
they engage in a self-interested calculation of the advantages and
disadvantages afforded by the change in the terms of their agreement
from the UPA/common law regime to the RUPA regime. 15 They do not
"amend their partnership agreements, if appropriate ' 6 in some neutral
manner; they calculate their self-interest and determine on that basis
whether to amend their partnership agreement or simply await the
7
imposition of RUPA to change their agreement for them.'
Retroactive application of a new statute only matters if the
substantive provisions of the new statute differ from those of the statute
being displaced. 18 In the case of RUPA and the UPA/common law
regime it seeks to displace, the differences are significant.' 9 RUPA
makes several important changes in the underlying theory of the prior
uniform act. The new regime tends toward rejection of the aggregate
20
theory of the partnership relationship, and toward the entity theory.
The role of the partnership agreement is changed, and partners are given
much broader statutory
latitude to vary their relationship from that
2
provided in the statute. '
Other changes included in RUPA involve changes in the authority
of partners to bind the partnership, 22 changes in the nature of the
partnership interest, 23 changes in the mechanism for transfer of the

11.
12.
13.
14.
15.

Id.
Id.
See id.
Id.
See Vestal, supranote 1,at 279.

16. REVISED UNIF. P'SHIP ACT § 1206 cmt., 6 U.L.A. 267 (2001).
17. See Vestal, supranote 1,at 279.
18. See id.
at 273.
19. See id. at 274-81 (noting that differences between regimes include partner authority, the
nature of a partnership interest in property, rules governing the transfer of partnership interests, and
capacity to dissolve the partnership).
20. See id. at 274 & n.35.
21. See id. at 280-83; see also REVISED UNIF. P'SHiIP ACT § 103(a), 6 U.L.A. 73 (2001).
22. See Vestal, supranote 1, at 275 & n.36.
23. See id.at 275 & n.37.
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partnership property,24 changes in the formulation of partner liability for
the debts of the partnership, 25 and changes in the way in which a
partner's interest in the partnership is conceived and calculated.2 6 A
significant range of changes addresses what happens when a partner
wants out of the relationship. Any of these differences could
significantly alter the calculus of the deal originally struck by the
partners, making the retroactive application of RUPA, I believe,
fundamentally unfair.
For example, imagine a situation where Able, Baker and Clark form
a partnership under the UPA to buy racehorses. Able and Baker, who
know each other well and have done business together frequently in the
past, put up fifty percent of the capital. Clark puts up the remaining fifty
percent of the capital. The partnership agreement expresses the
agreement of the partners that the partnership is one at will, and not for a
definite term or particular undertaking.
Clark is unsure about how things will work out with Able and
Baker, who he only knows in passing, but he understands that he is
protected by the provisions of the UPA. Clark can cause the dissolution
of the partnership by his express will at any time.27 Upon dissolution,
Clark knows, the authority of the partners to act for the partnership is
terminated, except as is necessary to wind up the partnership's affairs or
complete transactions already begun.28 Finally, Clark knows that he has
the right to participate in the winding up. 29 In short, Clark knows that he
can dissolve the partnership and force a winding up-or, in more
practical terms, dissolve the partnership and negotiate from a position of
strength-if the relationship with Able and Baker does not work out.
But what if the jurisdiction where Able, Baker and Clark formed
their partnership adopts RUPA and the transition period expires before
Clark realizes the relationship is not going to work out? Because of the
retroactive application of RUPA, Clark is left with a set of partnership
termination provisions far different from those upon which he counted at
the inception of the partnership. Under RUPA section 601, Clark can
dissociate from the partnership-a concept and term new to partnership
law. 30 Clark's dissociation is not wrongful, 31 but neither is it within the
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

See id. at 275 & n.38.
See id. at 275 & n.39.
See id. at 275-76 & n.40.
SeeUNIF. P'SHIPACT § 31(1)(b), 6 U.L.A. 370 (2001).
See UNIF. P'SHIP ACT § 33, 6 U.L.A. 436 (2001).
See UNIF. P'SHIP ACT § 37, 6 U.L.A. 470 (2001).

30.

See UNIF. P'SHIPACT§ 601(1), 6 U.L.A. 163 (2001).

31.

See UNIF. P'SHIP ACT § 602(b), 6 U.L.A. 169 (2001).

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol35/iss1/9

4

Vestal: "Wide Open": Nevada's Innovative Market in Partnership Law
20063

NEVADA 'S INNOVATIVE PARTNERSHIP LAW

range of circumstances that requires the partnership to be dissolved and
its affairs wound up. 32 Under RUPA, Clark's partnership interest is
purchased for a price established under the statute.33 In short, Able and
Baker can determine to continue the partnership and simply buy Clark
out-in the transition from the UPA to RUPA Clark has lost the ability
to force a winding up of the partnership business, and with that lost the
position of strength he had under the UPA. The problem with the
retroactive application of RUPA is that this loss of position for Clark is
unavoidable. Even if Clark recognizes the disadvantage under RUPA
and tries to amend the partnership agreement to preserve the partners'
pre-RUPA positions, the other partners have no incentive to agree to the
amendment; they have only to wait out the transition period to have the
law put Clark in a position of disadvantage.
The most problematic features of RUPA, the changes which make
the retroactive application of the new regime the most unfair, are the
changes RUPA makes in regard to the fiduciary duties of the partners
inter se. For example, RUPA removes the duty to disclose from the
group of fiduciary duties-a status it had under the
UPA/common law
34
regime-and makes it a non-fiduciary "obligation."
As to those obligations which RUPA leaves as "fiduciary," the
language of the uniform act purports to be an exclusive formulation
which precludes common law development. 35 The formula limits the
fiduciary obligations to those of a duty of loyalty and a duty of care.36
An "obligation of good faith and fair dealing"-purportedly nonfiduciary in character-arguably restricts the UPA/common law

32. See UNIF. P'SHIP ACT § 801, 6 U.L.A. 189-90 (2001).
33. See UNIF. P'SHIP ACT § 701, 6 U.L.A. 175-76 (2001). Under section 701(a), if there is no
dissolution and winding up, "the partnership shall cause the dissociated partner's interest in the

partnership to be purchased for a buyout price determined pursuant to subsection (b)." Id.
Section 701(b) sets the purchase price as:
[T]he amount that would have been distributable to the dissociating partner under Section

807(b) if, on the date of dissociation, the assets of the partnership were sold at a price
equal to the greater of the liquidation value or the value based on the sale of the entire
business as a going concern without the dissociated partner and the partnership were
wound up as of that date.
Id.
34.

HILLMAN, VESTAL & WEIDNER, supra note 6, at 184-86.

35. See id.at 192-94. Professor Melvin Eisenberg took issue with this formulation in his
famous letter to the assembled Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. Letter from Melvin A.
Eisenberg to The Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, at 2 (July 27, 1992) (on file with author)
[hereinafter Eisenberg July 27, 1992 Letter] ("[T]he duty of loyalty rests in large part on social

understandings of fairness and morality, and those understandings are always changing.").
36.

HILLMAN, VESTAL & WEIDNER, supra note 6, at 192-93.
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formulation.3 7 Additionally, RUPA's fiduciary duties are narrowly
defined3 8 and temporally restricted.39 It is, as one noted commentator
observed to the assembled Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, a
"pinched and almost mean-spirited vision of the duty of loyalty. ' 4°
The potential uneven fiduciary duty effects of the movement from
the UPA/common law regime to RUPA as applied to pre-existing
partnerships are legion. A situation which might call for fiduciary-based
disclosures under the common law might not require disclosure under
RUPA. 4 1 A fact pattern which would impose sanctions on a partner for
violation of the common law fiduciary duty of good faith under the
UPA/common law regime might not come within the ambit of the
RUPA non-fiduciary obligation of good faith and fair dealing.
Retroactive application of RUPA would be less of a problem if
partners under the new RUPA regime had an obligation "to consider the
changes effected by RUPA and to amend their partnership agreements, if
appropriate" tempered by a fiduciary obligation to conform to some
notion of the collective good.4 2 Such would be the case if, for example,
RUPA charged partners in pre-existing partnerships to amend the
partnership agreement in such a way as to duplicate the original deal as
closely as possible. This would create a situation in which "each partner
had an obligation to subordinate his or her individual interest to the
collective interest ... But, of course, this is not the way in which
RUPA is structured. RUPA provides that "[a] partner does not violate a
duty or obligation under this [Act] or under the partnership agreement
37. Id. at 195-97.
38. See id. at 194.
at 200-04.
39. See id.
40. Eisenberg July 27, 1992 Letter, supra note 35, at 4. Professor Eisenberg characterized the
reformulation of the fiduciary duties of partners inter se as "appalling." Id.at 1.
41. One such fact pattern is found in Alexander v. Sims, 249 S.W.2d 832 (Ark. 1952). The
case involved two partners in a jewelry store. They had entered into an agreement that the survivor
of them would receive the deceased partner's interest in the partnership. At the time of the
agreement, one partner knew that the other had terminal cancer. The sick partner was not aware of
her illness. See id. at 832-33. There had been no demand, so there was no UPA section 20 duty to
disclose. UNIF. P'SHIP ACT § 20, 6 U.L.A. 188 (2001) ("Partners shall render on demand true and
full information of all things affecting the partnership to any partner ...").The court found a
common law obligation to disclose. Under RUPA, assuming that section 403 is construed to
displace the common law, the result would be different unless the knowledge of the ill partner's
medical condition is "information concerning the partnership's business and affairs reasonably
required for the proper exercise of the partner's rights and duties under the partnership agreement or
"REVISED UNIF. P'SHIP ACT § 403, 6 U.L.A. 140 (2001). Certainly an interpretation
this [Act] ....
bringing this factual situation within the RUPA disclosure obligation is possible; just as surely it is
not the only credible interpretation.
42. REVISED UNIF. P'SHIP ACT § 1206 cmt., 6 U.L.A.267 (2001).
43. Vestal, supra note 1,at 279.
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merely because the partner's conduct furthers the partner's own
44
interest.

Note that this is not a constitutional argument. I assume that the
RUPA savings clause tracks the minimum requirements of the
Constitution.45 The argument has always been one of public policy and
the fair formulation of our legal rules.
Thirty-six jurisdictions other than Nevada have adopted RUPA as
this is being written. Sixteen adopted the retroactivity provision without
modification by simply inserting the applicable dates.46 Another sixteen
jurisdictions modified the retroactivity provisions in ways that did not
change the underlying policy of retroactivity.47 Only four of the adopting
44. REVISED UNIF. P'SHIP ACT § 404(e), 6 U.L.A. 143 (2001).
45. See Vestal, supra note I, at 274 n.34; see also REVISED UNIF. P'SHIP ACT § 1207 & cmt.,
6 U.L.A. 272 (2001).
46. See HILLMAN, VESTAL & WEIDNER, supra note 6, at 510. Not that merely inserting the
effective dates proved all that easy a task. West Virginia managed to insert the dates in such a way
that the transition period ran from June 9, 1995 through July 1, 1995-all of three weeks. Uniform
Partnership Act, 1995 W. Va. Acts, ch. 250, § 47B-10-4 (codified at W. VA. CODE § 47B- 11-4
(2006)).
47. Alaska changed the language to make specific reference to limited liability partnerships
and to specify which statute applied to partnerships not governed by RUPA. Uniform Partnership
Act, 2000 Alaska Sess. Laws, ch. 115, § 10. Arkansas made stylistic changes. Uniform Partnership
Act, 1999 Ark. Acts 1518, § 1205. Connecticut added a subsection specifying which statute applied
to partnerships not governed by RUPA. Uniform Partnership Act, 2000 Conn. Legis. Serv. 00-50,
§ 3 (codified at CONN. GEN. STAT. § 34-398 (2006)). The District of Columbia made stylistic
changes. Revised Uniform Partnership Act, 4 D.C. Reg. 777 (Apr. 9, 1997) (codified at D.C. CODE
§ 33-112.04 (2001)). Florida changed the election language to specify the period during which an
election could be made. Revised Uniform Partnership Act, 1995 Fla. Sess. Laws Serv., ch. 95-242,
§ 14 (repealed 2005). Idaho made stylistic changes. Uniform Partnership Act, 1998 Idaho Sess.
Laws, ch. 65, § 2 (codified at IDAHO CODE ANN. § 53-3-1204 (2006)). Illinois made stylistic
changes. 2002 II1. Legis. Serv. P.A. 92-740, § 1206 (codified at 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. 206/1206
(2002)). Kansas made stylistic changes. Uniform Partnership Act, 1998 Kan. Sess. Laws, ch. 93,
§ 68 (codified at KAN. STAT. ANN. § 56a-1304 (2005)). Montana omits the section entirely. UNIF.
P'SHIP ACT § 1206, 6 U.L.A. 269 (2001) (section entitled "Action in Adopting Jurisdictions"
following Comment). Mississippi made stylistic changes. Uniform Partnership Act, 2004 Miss.
Laws, ch. 458, § 1205 (codified at MISS. CODE ANN. § 79-13-1205). Nebraska made stylistic
changes. Uniform Partnership Act of 1998, 1997 Neb. Laws L.B. 523, § 64 (codified at NEV. REV.
STAT. § 67-464 (2006)). Oklahoma changed the language to make specific reference to limited
liability partnerships and to make stylistic changes. Oklahoma Revised Uniform Partnership Act,
1997 Okla. Sess. Law Serv., ch. 399, § 63 (West) (codified at OKLA. STAT. tit. 54, § 1-1206 (2006)).
South Dakota changed the language to make specific reference to limited liability partnerships.
Uniform Partnership Act, 2001 S.D. Sess. Laws, ch. 249, § 1206 (codified at S.D. CODIFIED LAWS
§ 48-7A-1206 (2006)). Tennessee makes stylistic changes. Revised Uniform Partnership Act of
2001, 2001 Tenn. Pub. Acts, ch. 353, § 1206 (codified at TENN. CODE ANN. § 61-1-1206 (2006)).
Vermont makes stylistic changes. 1998 Vt. Acts & Resolves 149, § I (codified at VT. STAT. ANN.
tit. 11, § 3312 (2005)). The Virgin Islands made stylistic changes. Uniform Partnership and Limited
Partnership Acts, 1998 V.I. Sess. Laws 6205 (codified at V.I. CODE ANN. tit. 26, § 273 (2005)).
Virginia made stylistic changes. Uniform Partnership Act, 1996 Va. Legis. Serv., ch. 292, § I
(codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 50-73.147 (2006)).

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2006

7

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 35, Iss. 1 [2006], Art. 9
HOFSTRA LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 35:275

jurisdictions other than Nevada modified the retroactivity provisions in
ways that changed the underlying policy of RUPA.4 8 The most extreme
of these are the two states-New Mexico and Kentucky-which adopted
the "coexistence model" I suggested as RUPA was being drafted.4 9 This
is the better solution, and is outlined in the next section. Nevada,
discussed in the fifth section, took its statute a significant step further.
III.

THE BETTER SOLUTION: NO RETROACTIVE APPLICATION

As I suggested a decade ago, the better approach is not to
retroactively apply RUPA, but rather to leave pre-existing partnerships
under pre-RUPA partnership law. 50 This is the co-existence model, and
it is sufficient to protect the interests of all the partners by not imposing
upon them changes in the calculus of the deal they struck.5
A reasonable addition to the co-existence model would be an opt-in
provision, under which the partners could agree to the application of
RUPA. RUPA has a number of progressive features; it is entirely
possible that partners in pre-existing partnerships would see mutual
advantage in coming under the new regime.

48. Arizona changed the retroactivity policy of RUPA to make RUPA retroactive at the end
of the transition period only to pre-existing partnerships that filed a statement of qualification as a
limited liability partnership. Revised Uniform Partnership Act, 1996 Ariz. Legis. Serv., ch. 226,
§ 48 (West) (incorporated into Historical and Statutory Notes, ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 29-1001
(2006)) ("Beginning January 1, 2000, title 29, chapter 5, Arizona Revised Statutes, governs all
partnerships, including all general and limited partnerships that have filed a statement of
qualification under section 29-1101, Arizona Revised Statutes, or an application for registration as a
limited liability partnership under prior law."). Wyoming excluded pre-existing partnerships from
the operation of W.S. 17-21-802 (continuation of the partnership after dissolution) and provided that
"[tihis chapter does not impair the obligations of a contract existing on January 1, 1994 or affect an
action or proceeding begun or right accrued before January 1, 1994." Uniform Partnership Act,
1993 Wy. Sess. Laws, ch. 194, § I (codified at WY. STAT. ANN. § 17-21-1003 (2005)). Only New
Mexico and Kentucky eliminated retroactivity, providing that pre-existing partnerships would be
governed by RUPA only if they elected to do so. Uniform Partnership Act, 1997 N.M. Laws, ch. 76,
§ 13 (codified at N.M. STAT. ANN. § 54-1A-1205 (West 2006)); 2006 Ky. Laws, ch. 149, § 79 (to be
codified at KY. REV STAT. ANN. § 362).
49. See Vestal, supra note 1, at 285-86. 1 should note, just for the record, that elimination of
retroactivity in Kentucky came about at the insistence of a member of the Legislature, not at my
suggestion, and I wrote a letter arguing against this departure from the otherwise near-uniform
adoption of RUPA section 1206(b). The original draft of RUPA as submitted to the Kentucky
General Assembly, as to which I testified favorably on numerous occasions, did not modify section
1206. One cannot help but admire the legislator's intuitive good sense, however.
50. Vestal, supra note 1, at 285-86.
51. See id. at 274 ("[Tlhe Revised Act operates indirectly to change the calculus of the deal
embodied in existing partnership relations by changing the essential background relation of the
parties and the function of the partnership agreement.").
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New Mexico and Kentucky modified RUPA to provide that preexisting partnerships will 52not be governed by RUPA unless they elect to
come within its coverage.
IV.

INTERSTATE COMPETITION

Is No

SOLUTION

TO RETROACTIVE APPLICATION

If one accepts the argument that it is inequitable to some partners
to, in effect, impose a renegotiation of their deal by retroactively
applying RUPA, the fair treatment of pre-existing partnerships is to
leave them under the UPA/common law regime unless they elect to
come within the RUPA regime. 53 One might argue that the availability
of the UPA/common law regime in other, non-RUPA-adopting
jurisdictions would be sufficient to preserve fairness. In effect, one could
depend upon an interstate market in partnership law to protect these
partners.
Such an argument would be in error in several respects. First,
thirty-seven jurisdictions have already adopted RUPA in one form or
another. 54 It is quite conceivable that RUPA will eventually be adopted
in all jurisdictions
and the option of taking refuge in non-adopting states
55
lost.
be
will
52. Uniform Partnership Act, 1997 N.M. Laws, ch. 76, § 13 (codified at N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 54-1A-1205 (West 2006)); 2006 Ky. Laws, ch. 149, § 79 (to be codified at KY. REV STAT. ANN.
§ 362.1-1204).
53. To avoid the same problem one faces with retroactive application of RUPA-the forced
re-negotiation of the partners' deal-such an election would presumably have to be either
unanimous or less than unanimous by virtue of a prior agreement of the partners. This follows the
RUPA provision for such an election during the transition period. Under section 1206(c), "a
partnership voluntarily may elect, in the manner provided in its partnership agreement or by law for
amending the partnership agreement" during the transition period to be governed by RUPA.
REVISED UNIF. P'SHIP ACT § 1206(c), 6 U.L.A. 267 (2001). Under section 401(0), "an amendment
to the partnership agreement may be undertaken only with the consent of all of the partners." UNIF.
P'SHIP ACT § 401(j), 6 U.L.A. 133 (2001). Note that the provisions of section 401(j) are not subject
to a limitation on agreed modification under section 103(b). See REVISED UNIF. P'SHIP ACT
§ 103(b), 6 U.L.A. 73 (2001).
54. HILLMAN, VESTAL & WEIDNER, supra note 6, app. B at 507-11 (showing thirty-six
jurisdictions adopted RUPA, not including Kentucky's adoption of the statute, post-publication).
With the addition of Kentucky, thirty-seven jurisdictions adopted RUPA in some form. See 2006
Ky. Laws, ch. 149, § 79 (to be codified at KY. REV STAT. ANN. § 362.1-1204).
55. The coexistence model statutes in New Mexico and Kentucky do not suffice since they
limit the availability of the UPA/common law regime to partnerships which pre-dated their
respective adoptions of RUPA; partnerships formed after the initial date of RUPA (RUPA
§ 1206(a)(1)) may not elect to be governed by the UPA. Uniform Partnership Act, 1997 N.M. Laws,
ch. 76, § 13 (codified at N.M. STAT. ANN. § 54-IA-1205 (West 2006)); 2006 Ky. Laws, ch. 149,
§ 79 (to be codified at KY. REV STAT. ANN. § 362.1-1204). Nevada's competition model statute
would be available, but is insufficient for reasons developed later in this Article. See infra Part V.
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Second, with respect to partnerships that do not make a limited
liability partnership election, RUPA provides that "the law of the
jurisdiction in which a partnership has its chief executive office governs
relations among the partners and between the partners and the
partnership. 56 Thus, general partnerships cannot as easily change the
applicable legal regime as can corporations. 7 Indeed, the problem
becomes even more complex when one considers the choice of law rules
of the UPA/common law jurisdictions, which are quite different from the
RUPA "chief executive office" rule. 8
Third, and most importantly, any attempt to change the governing
law by moving for choice of law purposes to a non-RUPA-adopting
jurisdiction would presumably require the consent of all the partners.
This leaves the partner disadvantaged by the retroactive application of
RUPA in the same position of being at the mercy of the partners
advantaged by the retroactive application. This appears to be true in the
context of both a general partnership, which has not made the limited
60
59
liability partnership election, and one which has made the election.
As to pre-existing partnerships in RUPA-adopting states, it is clear
that interstate competition-a situation in which some states do not
adopt RUPA and thus offer the alternative of the status quo ante-is not

56. REVISED UNIF. P'SHIP ACT § 106(a), 6 U.L.A. 88 (2001). One might argue that a
partnership which did not make a limited liability partnership election would be free to make a
choice of law apart from the chief executive office rule of section 106(a). Indeed, the official
comments to section 106 note that "[lt]he choice-of-law rule provided by subsection (a) is only a
default rule, and the partners may by agreement select the law of another State to govern their
internal affairs, subject to generally applicable conflict of laws requirements." REVISED UNIF.
P'SHIP ACT § 106 cmt., 6 U.L.A. 88 (2001). Nevertheless, such a change would require unanimity
under section 401(j), as an amendment to the partnership agreement. REVISED UNIF. P'SHIP ACT
§ 401(j), 6 U.L.A. 133 (2001). In contrast, partnerships that make a limited liability partnership
election are governed by the law of the jurisdiction in which they file. REVISED UNIF. P'SHIP ACT
§ 106(b), 6 U.L.A. 88 (2001).
57. Compare REVISED UNIF. P'SHIP ACT § 106(a), 6 U.L.A. 88 (2001), with MODEL Bus.
CORP. ACT § 2.03 (2002) (incorporation), and MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 9.20 (2002)
(domestication).
58. Allan W. Vestal, Choice of Law and the FiduciaryDuties of Partners Under the Revised
Uniform PartnershipAct, 79 IOWA L. REV. 219, 225-30 (1994).
59. The presumption is that any act sufficient to move the chief executive office of the
partnership for purposes of RUPA section 106(a), especially if done for purposes of effectuating
such a change, would by definition be "[a]n act outside the ordinary course of business of a
partnership" and would thus require "the consent of all of the partners." REVISED UNIF. P'SHIP ACT
§ 401(j), 6 U.L.A. 133 (2001).
60. Again, the presumption is that filing as a limited liability partnership in another
jurisdiction for purposes of RUPA section 106(b), especially if done for purposes of effectuating
such a change, would by definition be "[a]n act outside the ordinary course of business of a
partnership" and would thus require "the consent of all of the partners." Id.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol35/iss1/9

10

Vestal: "Wide Open": Nevada's Innovative Market in Partnership Law
2006]

NEVADA'S INNOVATIVE PARTNERSHIP LAW

sufficient. If interstate competition is not sufficient, what is required is
intra-statecompetition.
By adopting coexistence model statutes, New Mexico and
Kentucky got this partially right. But Nevada, as it turns out, took the
non-retroactivity analysis one step further with its statute. Nevada
provides that any partnership, no matter when it is formed, has the right
to choose between the UPA/common law partnership law regime and
RUPA. 61 In so doing, Nevada has created a comprehensive, intra-state
market in partnership law.
V.

THE BRAVE NEW WORLD IN NEVADA

The state tourism slogan of Nevada is "Wide Open." 62 The slogan
might as accurately be applied to Nevada's partnership law regime.
Nevada took the coexistence model statutes of New Mexico and
Kentucky and went one significant step further: Nevada adopted a
"competition model statute" under which every partnership can elect to
63
be governed by either the UPA/common law regime or RUPA.
This is not to say that Nevada does not differentiate between
partnerships that pre-existed the effective date of RUPA and
partnerships that were formed after the effective date. Because
partnership is the default form of business entity, provisions must of
course be made for inadvertent partnerships and partnerships that are
created without the benefit of legal counsel. The Nevada enactment of
RUPA thus differentiates between partnerships that pre-existed the
effective date of the statute-which are by default initially governed by
the Nevada UPA/common law regime64-and those that are formed on
or after the RUPA effective date-which are by default initially
governed by Nevada RUPA.65 Like every other enactment of RUPA,
61.

See NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 87.025.1 (LexisNexis

2005); HILLMAN, VESTAL &

WEIDNER, supra note 6, at 366.
62. See Nevada: Wide Open, http://www.travelnevada.com/facts-student.asp (last visited Oct.
12, 2006).
63. See Vestal, supra note 1, at 287-88; HILLMAN, VESTAL & WEIDNER, supra note 6, at 366.
64. See NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 87.025 (LexisNexis 2005).
65. See NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 87.4314 (LexisNexis 2005). Actually, Nevada got the
statutory language wrong. The provision makes the UPA-based statute automatically applicable to
(a) partnerships formed before the July 1, 2006 effective date of RUPA, which do not elect to be
governed by RUPA; and (b) to partnerships formed after the effective date of RUPA, which elect to
be governed by the UPA-based statute. NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 87.025 (LexisNexis 2005). But the
provision, which should make RUPA automatically applicable to (a) partnerships formed on or after
the July 1, 2006 effective date of RUPA that do not elect to be governed by the UPA-based statute;
and (b) partnerships formed before the effective date of RUPA that elect to be governed by RUPA,
gets it exactly backwards: "The provisions of NRS 87.4301 to 87.357, inclusive [RUPA], apply to a
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Nevada RUPA allows pre-existing partnerships to opt in to RUPA.6 6
Where Nevada is unique is that under Nevada RUPA, partnerships

formed after the effective date of the new act may opt into the old
UPA/common law regime.67 By allowing any partnership to elect to be
governed by either partnership law regime, Nevada has established a

true intrastate market in partnership law.
While the Nevada development is potentially important, it is

necessary to note what the Nevada statute does not do. First, the Nevada
formulation does not provide a useful path to partners in partnerships

governed by state law other than Nevada's when their interests are
threatened by the prospect of the retroactive application of RUPA in
their state.68 Second, the Nevada provisions do not help inadvertent
partnerships or partnerships formed without the benefit of reasonably
sophisticated legal counsel. As a default matter, only those of such
partnerships which come within the more general Nevada choice of law
analysis (as to the UPA/common law regime) or which have their chief
executive office in Nevada (as to the RUPA regime) will have the
benefit of the Nevada formulation.69
What Nevada's unique retroactive application provision does is to
allow partners ex ante to choose the UPA/common law regime without
having to worry that the calculus of their deal will be undone. That is
something they cannot do in jurisdictions that have already adopted
RUPA, where new partnerships are governed by the new act. Nor can
partnership: 1) Which was formed before July 1, 2006 (the effective date of RUPA).... or 2)
Which is formed on or after July 1, 2006, and which voluntarily elects to be governed by the
provisions of NRS 87.4301 to 87.4357, inclusive [RUPA]." NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 87.4314
(LexisNexis 2005) (emphasis added). Of course, the provision should read the reverse: The
provisions of NRS 87.4301 to 87.357, inclusive [RUPA], apply to a partnership: I) Which was
formed on or after July 1, 2006 (the effective date of RUPA); or 2) Which is formed before July 1,
2006, and which voluntarily elects to be governed by the provisions of NRS 87.4301 to 87.4357,
inclusive [RUPA]. See UNIF. P'SHIP ACT § 1206, 6 U.L.A. 267 (2001).
66. See NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 87.4314.2 (LexisNexis 2005).
67. See NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 87.025.2 (LexisNexis 2005) ("The provisions of NRS
87.010 to 87.430 [the UPA-based statute], inclusive, apply to a partnership... 2. Which is formed
on or after July 1, 2006 (the effective date of RUPA), and which voluntarily elects to be governed
by the provisions of NRS 87.010 to 87.430, inclusive.").
68. This is due to, as noted earlier, the presumption that any act sufficient to move the chief
executive office of the partnership for purposes of RUPA section 106(a), or the act of making a
limited liability partnership election to trigger RUPA section 106(b) (especially if done for purposes
of effectuating such a change), would by definition be "[an act outside the ordinary course of
business of a partnership," and would thus require, "the consent of all of the partners." UNIF. P'SHIP
ACT § 401(0), 6 U.L.A. 133 (2001).
69. See NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 87.4319 (LexisNexis 2005) (providing that "the law of the
jurisdiction in which a partnership has its chief executive office governs relations among the
partners").
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they do that in jurisdictions which have yet to adopt RUPA, where such
partnerships will be governed by RUPA after the transition period unless
the state adopts either a coexistence or competition model statute.
Are there prospective partners who would ex ante choose the
UPA/common law regime over RUPA? Of course there are. Simply
imagine a partnership of three essentially equivalent, very powerful and
sophisticated parties. Assume their contributions to the firm are very
substantial but come at different points in the project. Anticipate that the
venture is to be of long duration and that the path it will follow is largely
unpredictable. Finally, give the participants lawyers who lack the hubris
to think they can anticipate all of the possible eventualities, and who
value the good faith application of intelligent and dispassionate judicial
oversight over mechanical predictability. In such a situation, the parties
might well decide to opt into the UPA/common law regime rather than
RUPA.
Now, it might be argued that, using the partner agreement primacy
provisions of RUPA, the new regime could duplicate the UPA/common
law regime, thus providing the partners the other benefits of RUPAdeemed partner accounts, the dissociation mechanism, filed statements,
readily available suits for accounting, and the like-while maintaining
the availability of common law analysis in the area of fiduciary duties. Is
the argument well-taken? Perhaps not.
The ability of the partners to duplicate the UPA/common law
regime within RUPA depends on the interpretation of RUPA
section 103. The analysis begins with RUPA section 103(a): "Except as
otherwise provided in subsection (b), relations among the partners and
between the partners and the partnership are governed by the partnership
agreement. To the extent the partnership agreement does not otherwise
provide, this [Act] governs relations among the partners and between the
partners and the partnership. 70
Could the partners, in the partnership agreement, vary the essential
fiduciary duty policy under RUPA-that "[t]he only fiduciary duties a
partner owes to the partnership and the other partners are the duty of
71
loyalty and the duty of care set forth in subsections (b) and (c)" -to

reinstitute the pre-RUPA reliance on the common law? To do so would
require a basic reworking of RUPA section 404. The question arises:
Does RUPA section 103 permit such a fundamental change in the
fiduciary duty rules?

70.
71.

UNIF. P'SHIP ACT § 103(a), 6 U.L.A. 73 (2001).
UNIF. P'SHIP ACT § 404(a), 6 U.L.A. 143 (2001).
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RUPA section 103(b) specifies certain provisions as to which the
ability of the partners to vary the statutory provision by their agreement
is restricted. Both the fiduciary duty of loyalty and the fiduciary duty of
care-the two components of the statutory formulation of partner
fiduciary duties-appear in RUPA section 103(b). As to the duty of
loyalty, the section provides that the partners may not "eliminate the
duty of loyalty. 72 As to the duty of care, the section provides that the
partners may not "unreasonably reduce the duty of care., 73 Since the
proposed action-the expansion of the fiduciary duties of partners
through a reinstitution of the common law-would preserve, not
eliminate, the duty of loyalty and expand, not reduce, the duty of care,
RUPA section 103(b) would seem to be satisfied. 4
And yet, for two reasons, I hesitate to think that one should depend
upon partnership agreements under RUPA to return the fiduciary duties
of the partners inter se to the pre-RUPA state. First, I would be
apprehensive that a judge might balk at enforcing such a fundamental
revision of the fiduciary duty provisions of RUPA. Second, I would be
hesitant to rely upon the common law process to interpret the fiduciary
duties of the partners in a situation where the robust development of the
common law had been brought to a general halt by the passage of
RUPA. For those reasons, I would think the partners would be better off
relying upon the Nevada statutory formulation, rather than partner
agreements under RUPA section 103, to have their partnership fiduciary
duties governed by the common law.
The Nevada retroactivity provisions supply prospective partners
with the ability to adopt and maintain a UPA/common law formulation
of fiduciary duties, rather than being forced to look to the RUPA
formulation.75 The Nevada enactment represents a significant advance in
partnership law over what is provided in RUPA.

72. UNIF. P'SHIP ACT § 103(b)(3), 6 U.L.A. 73 (2001).
73. UNIF. P'SHiIPACT§ 103(b)(4), 6 U.L.A. 73 (2001).
74. It would be utterly consistent with the underlying theory of RUPA to allow partner
agreements to expand the duty of loyalty and raise the duty of care. The official commentary to
section 103 says as much as to the duty of care. See UNIF. P'SHIP ACT § 103 cmt. 6, 6 U.L.A. 75
(2001) ("The standard may, of course, be increased by agreement to one of ordinary care or an even
higher standard of care."). This was in fact done in the Kentucky adoption of RUPA, which
radically altered RUPA § 404(c) and adopted a formulation akin to a standard of ordinary care. See
2006 Ky. Laws, ch. 149, § 79 (to be codified at KY. REV STAT. ANN. § 362).
75. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
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CONCLUSION: TO THOSE STATES THAT HAVE NOT YET ACTED

Nevada may be said to have led the way with its innovative solution
to the retroactivity question. Could other states, which have yet to adopt
RUPA, profitably follow Nevada's lead? Yes, for two reasons.
The first reason other states should emulate Nevada on the question
of RUPA retroactivity is that such a system is fundamentally fairer to
partners in pre-existing partnerships than is the RUPA retroactivity
regime. By eliminating the threat of retroactive application, the Nevada
competition model statute-and the coexistence model statutes of New
Mexico and Kentucky-preserve the calculus of the original deal and
allow the partners to negotiate as to whether they will make a transition
to RUPA from positions neither enhanced nor diminished by the
legislature.
The second reason other states should emulate Nevada on the
question of RUPA retroactivity is entrepreneurial. By providing newly
forming partnerships a way in which to come under the UPA/common
law regime, and a reasonably secure prospect of remaining there, the
Nevada competition model statute-but not the coexistence model
statutes of New Mexico and Kentucky-serves an otherwise unmet
market.
Nevada has led the way. One can but hope that the jurisdictions that
adopt RUPA in years to come will live up to Nevada's tourism slogan
marketing slogan of Las Vegas, "what
"Wide Open," and not 7the
6
here."
stays
here,
happens

76. Newt Briggs, Slogan's Run: Jeff Candido and the Five Words that Revitalized Las Vegas,
4
LAS VEGAS MERCURY, Apr. 8, 2004, available at http://www.lasvegasmercury.com/200 /
MERC-Apr-08-Thu-2004/23579319.html.
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